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Closer to Brussels than to
Rome? The EU as the new external
referent for a secularised Irish
society and a redefined Catholic
identity
Jean-Christophe Penet
1 It can be easily argued that from the creation of the Irish State and well into the 1960s
Catholicism was at its apex in Ireland, as the institutional Church turned out to be one of
the great victors of the nation’s war for independence. As shown by Patsy McGarry, it was
a time when “Ireland was producing so many priests and nuns that between one-third
and a half of them went on the missions” 1.  In an article about Catholic and national
identity, however, Timothy J. White shows that, despite appearances, “By the late 1950s
and early 1960s, the integration of Catholicism and national identity which had delayed
or prevented the secularisation that had come to the rest of Europe finally yielded to
those forces associated with the arrival of industrialisation and urbanisation 2.” In fact,
just as Irish nationalism, which had achieved most of its objectives by the 1960s, had
paradoxically become exhausted at that time – as shown by the decision to apply for EEC
membership in 1961 – it seems that the high point of its most faithful ally, the Catholic
Church, had also already passed in Ireland by the end of that decade 3.  It is therefore
legitimate to wonder whether Ireland’s will to join in the European project was the result
of or further entailed the weakening position of the Catholic Church in Ireland, and how
the latter reacted to those changing circumstances. How did the Church react to the
gradual crumbling down of its monopoly within Irish society at a time when the country
started becoming more liberal-minded, increasingly founding its hopes on the emerging
liberal and secular European Community? To try and answer this question, we shall first
have a closer look at the way EEC membership has transformed the relationship between
Church and State since Ireland started its liberal dawn in the late 1950s. This should lead
us  to  note  that  the  Church’s  loss  of  its  monopoly  in  Ireland  has  not  meant  the
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disappearance of its influence in the public sphere. In fact, the Church has pragmatically
and successfully adapted its views on the European project over the years in order to
survive. This has, in turn, brought about a redefinition of its perceived role both within
Irish society and within the European Union. 
2 On an institutional level, the liberal 4 dawn of the sixties started in Ireland when Seán
Lemass became Taoiseach in 1959, since he engendered, along with Ken Whitaker 5, what
Liam Ryan calls  the “creation of  the second Ireland 6” –  the one that  came after  de
Valera’s. Even though Seán Lemass had been, as minister in de Valera’s government, an
advocate of isolationism, he decided, as Taoiseach, that it was time for Ireland to improve
its grim economy by trading isolationism for free trade. As underlined by Marie-Claire
Considère-Charon: “Tandis que le projet de marché commun se consolidait peu à peu, l’Irlande
allait à son tour redéfinir ses orientations et ses priorités. Une nouvelle logique économique sous le
signe  de  l’ouverture  allait  se  mettre  en  place 7.”  Recognising  that  Ireland’s  size,  its
geographical  location  and  its  insularity  somewhat  hindered  the  country’s  economic
boom, Lemass nonetheless claimed that these obstacles could be removed by a new and
appropriate economic strategy. As a result, crucial policy changes were brought together
in Thomas Kenneth Whitaker’s seminal paper Economic Development (1958). These policies
were,  as  shown  by  John  Bradley,  “a  heady  and  novel  mix  of  commitment  to  trade
liberalisation, a range of direct and indirect grant aid to private firms, and a singular
incentive of zero corporation profit tax exports 8”. An attractive corporation tax rate and
the absence of  tariffs  were,  however,  but  a  beginning in the creation of  this  second
Ireland  which,  according  to  Liam Ryan,  “brought  economic  as  well  as  psychological
transformation to the country by providing a solid economic base 9”. It was in such a
context  that  Ireland sent  its  application for  EEC membership  along with  the  British
application in 1961.
3 It is true that Ireland could barely have done otherwise once the British Prime Minister
Macmillan had announced the intention of the UK to apply for membership, as the 1938
Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement had made the UK Ireland’s greatest trading partner. Yet
there are reasons to believe that the application also corresponded to a genuine will on
the part of the Irish government to join in the new economic perspective opened up by
the European Economic Community. Even though the joint Anglo-Irish application was
rejected due to General de Gaulle’s staunch refusal to let the UK become a new EEC-
member – to be finally accepted in 1972 under Georges Pompidou’s presidency – the
seriousness  with  which  the  Irish  took  their  application  was  demonstrated  in  the
educational domain. After the war, most European countries had developed an egalitarian
vision  of  society  in  which  education  had  a  key  role  to  play.  Equal  educational
opportunities, it was believed, would enable the disadvantaged to climb the social ladder.
In Ireland, however, education had remained the stronghold of the Catholic Church, and
“the  Church’s  concentration  on  the  humane  disciplines,  and  its  endorsement  of  the
classical  liberal  education  tradition  had  resulted  in  technical  knowledge  being
undervalued10”.  In  1966,  the  –  originally  European  –  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-
operation  and  Development  (OECD)  published  a  report  entitled  “Investment  in
Education”. The OECD reproached the Irish education system for having a strong degree
of  class differentiation at  secondary and third levels  and it  strongly recommended a
change  in  the  Irish  curricular  emphasis  from  the  classical  humanist  tradition  –
championed  by  the  Church  –  to  “applied  knowledge”,  that  is  to  say  to  a  form  of
knowledge that could serve economic development. In the wake of the OECD report, the
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Department of Education decided to design new school curricula that would serve the
needs of  an industrial  economy.  The Department of  Education’s  decision to take the
advice  of  the  OECD  cannot  be  underestimated,  as  it  represented  a  fundamental
philosophical shift in thinking on education.11 The government’s decision to answer the
needs of the Irish economy in spite of the Church’s unwillingness to yield power in the
educational domain and, thereby, its decision to put an end to what had been the guiding
principle in education since the late 19th century,  shows that  Irish politics  and Irish
society  had  already  started  having  more  secular  preoccupations  in  the  mid-1960s.
Whether they were, at a political level, brought into the country by OECD reports or, at a
social level, by the foreign media and their foreign programmes (and we are thinking,
here, of the BBC), the more secular and liberal preoccupations of most Western societies
had well and truly penetrated Irish society by the end of the sixties.
4 In fact, the ease with which these crucial new policies were carried out and accepted in
Ireland tends to show that the country was already partly secularised at that stage. Truly,
one could believe that, due to the withdrawal of Irish society into an inclusive form of
nationalism progressively associated with Catholicism through the 19th century, and to
the isolationism championed by the Church-State-Nation triangle in De Valera’s moral
community, Ireland did not experience modernity. However, this interpretation ignores
the fact that one of the main characteristics of modernity was, after all, the creation of
new political communities. In its efforts to “restore” the Irish nation to the way it used to
be under the banner of religion, nationalism in Ireland was much more a political project
–  a  future-oriented political  belief  and ideology that  made ample  use  of  the past  to
legitimise  its  present  claims  –  than  a  religious  one.  Irish  nationalists  were  in  fact
unconsciously  changing  the  divine  order  by  imposing  their  own  nationalist  –  and
therefore  human  –  will  onto  this  order.  Even  though the  modern  political  ideology
adopted  by  modern  Ireland  –  its  political  belief  –  was  a  mix  of  nationalism and  of
Ultramontane Catholicism which rejected modern, secular values, it can be argued that
Irish society started its own secularisation process from the very moment it adopted this
very political  ideology.  Thus,  despite appearances,  De Valera’s  moral  community was
never completely achieved – and it was speedily dismissed once the time had come. If this
explains why the changes adopted in the 1960s, and notably the decision to apply for EEC
membership, were easily accepted by most of the Irish, it does not account for the Irish
hierarchy’s acceptance of the latter. In fact, this was probably due to the redefinition of
Catholic practices and of the role of the Church in society brought about by the second
Vatican Council. Started in 1962, the council, which consisted in an effort to adapt the
Catholic Church to the modern world, encouraged – albeit unconsciously – the advance of
secularisation,  since  it  recognised  the  modern  values  of  private  judgement  and  of
pluralism it had until then intransigently fought. With Vatican II, the Catholic Church was
turning the page on the intransigent chapter of its history, no less. However reluctantly,
the Irish Catholic hierarchy – which for the most part could not see any point in changing
anything within the Church,  as  there  were but  few visible  signs  of  secularisation in
Ireland at  the time –  followed Rome’s  instructions,  thereby remaining faithful  to  its
tradition of  unquestioning obedience to the Holy See.  It  consequently gave the Irish
government more leeway in terms of economic policies. What is more, there is another
reason why the Second Vatican Council participated in the Irish clergy’s acceptance of
the EEC-membership.  In  an  article  on  “Religious  phenomena  and  European
Identification”, Alfredo Canavero and Jean-Dominique Durand emphasised that:
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[…]  les  pèlerinages  à  Rome,  surtout  ceux  qui  ont  suivi  les  deux
guerres mondiales,  ou le concile de Vatican II,  ont représenté une
étape importante dans le processus d’intégration et dans la formation
d’une  mentalité  européenne  […].  Dans  une  perspective  originale,
Dominique  Gonnet  a  souligné  ce  que  l’événement  conciliaire  a
signifié  pour  la  rencontre  et  les  échanges  entre  les  évêques
européens après le cloisonnement des dernières années du pontificat
pacellien.  Il  a  défini  le  concile  comme  « le  point  d’ancrage  d’une
longue  histoire  européenne »  […].  Ce  fut  la  solidarité  entre  les
évêques  européens  et  leurs  sentiments  communs  qui  permirent
l’approbation  de  la  déclaration  sur  la  liberté  religieuse  Dignitatis
Humanae, avec des effets importants sur le développement de
l’œcuménisme et, par conséquent, une plus grande intégration parmi
les peuples européens 12.
5 Even though it would be fair to think that, due to Ireland’s neutrality during the war and
the apparent good health of Catholicism there, the Irish bishops did not share as much in
the feeling of solidarity as, say, their French counterparts, this does not mean that they
did not experience it at all. Upon coming back from Rome, Irish bishops were probably
much more willing to show themselves more enthusiastic about Ireland’s membership in
the EEC than in the 1950s, be it to control the change that was bound to emerge from it.
Indeed,  by the mid-1960s,  they were increasingly aware of  the fact  that  Ireland was
becoming visibly more secular. As confirmed by Timothy J. White:
[…] by integrating the Irish economy with those in Europe and the rest of the world,
[Seán] Lemass [had] necessarily unleashed forces that would challenge not only the
standard  of  living  of  the  Irish  but  also  their  priorities  and  values  in  life.  The
materialistic mentality of the Irish proliferated as material conditions in Ireland
dramatically improved in the 1960s 13.
6 In 1972, however, the year when its EC-membership joint application with the UK was
finally  accepted,  Ireland  still  bore  nearly  all  of  the  characteristics  of  a  Third-World
country. Its unbalanced economy was marked by high unemployment and emigration
levels as well as by bad infrastructures and a poorly skilled and insufficient workforce 14.
Things  were  soon  to  change  for  the  better,  though,  in  the  Emerald  Isle,  thanks  to
continued economic reform and massive EEC investments. Thus, as emphasised by John
Bradley:
The  Irish  economic  policy-making  environment  during  this  period  can  be
characterised as having shifted from one appropriate to a dependent state on the
periphery of the UK to that of a region more fully integrated into an encompassing
European economy. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) renovated and boosted Irish
productive capacity. The Single Market provided the primary source of demand. All
that  remained  was  for  a  big  push  on  improvement  in  physical  infrastructure,
education and training, and this arrived in the form of a dramatic innovation in
regional policy at the EU level 15.
7 The  link  between  Ireland’s  EEC  membership  and  its  improving  economy  certainly
explains why the Irish have been so favourable to the European project16.  In the 1972
referendum on EEC membership, 83 per cent of the Irish voted in favour of membership 17
. Fifteen years later, in the referendum on the Single European Act (May 1987), only 30
per cent of them rejected the act which was to open up an internal free market of 320
million consumers – with free movement of goods, services, people and capital ensured –
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by 31 December 1992. Economically, at least, this meant that the Irish were ready to do
away with their insular mentality to adopt, instead, a more global stand. In an article
published in the Jesuit magazine Studies in 1989, the then European Commissioner Irish-
born Peter  D.  Sutherland stated that  it  would  be  unfair  to  characterise  the  positive
attitude  of  the  Irish  towards  Europe  “as  simply  a  reflection  of  the  widespread
understanding that membership has brought substantial economic benefit 18”. He then
reminded his readers that in a survey conducted in Ireland at the end of 1988, 79 per cent
expressed the belief that Ireland had gained through membership as against, for example,
47 per cent and 55 per cent respectively in the UK and West Germany. Similarly, the
Catholic Church in Ireland at the time was quite zealous to show its endearment to the
European project. If it did, it was probably because it was aware, at that stage, of the fact
that Ireland’s political ideal of a moral community was but a remnant from the past, as
testified by the issue dedicated to “Secularisation in Ireland” in Studies in 1985. In the
editorial  of  the  Jesuit  magazine,  it  was  admitted  that  “The  Republic  is  no  longer
universally Roman Catholic and Nationalist as it seemed to be in the 1950s”. It was also
underlined that secularisation can be seen positively, as it helps people “move away from
the easy reliance on an overinstitutionalised Church to a more personal choice of faith”,
and therefore leads to “better religious individuals 19”. Following this idea that modernity
and secularisation were forces to be reckoned with rather than fought, the Irish Catholic
Church  no  longer  had  any  reason  to  show  itself  half-hearted  when  it  came  to  the
European project. In fact, the Irish hierarchy had to embrace the European project if it
wanted to influence it. This is how we can understand why the Irish bishops declared in a
lengthy statement in 1979 on the occasion of the first direct election to the European
Parliament:  “We  must  go  beyond  the  merely  economic  aspect  of  the  European
Community and see the desire that was there at its beginning and has remained at its
heart 20.”
8 Ireland’s  growing integration into the European Community nevertheless  remained a
true challenge for the Catholic Church in Ireland, as European Laws participated in the
further secularisation of the country’s laws and Constitution – which had been inspired
by Catholic teachings – and led, therefore, to a gradual dismantlement of the Church’s
moral monopoly in Irish society. The year Ireland became a member State, the Lynch
government held a referendum asking the Irish to consent to the deletion of the clause in
Article 44 of the 1937 Constitution which recognised the “special position” of the Catholic
Church.  The huge  support  in  favour  of  the  deletion of  the  clause  (85  per  cent)  can
nonetheless be seen as the obedience – however reluctant it might have been – of Irish
Catholics to the new precepts of Vatican II that championed a more ecumenical view of
religion. If this was the case, Rome and not Brussels remained Ireland’s external referent
at that date. One year later, in 1973, however, the same Irish Catholic hierarchy distanced
itself from its until then usual, dogmatic stand during the debate over Mary Robinson’s
highly polemical private member’s bill to liberalise the import and sale of contraceptives
in the Emerald Isle. Even though the Catholic hierarchy strongly warned against the dark
effects of generalising access to contraceptives, they declared: “There are many things
which the Catholic Church holds to be morally wrong and no one has ever suggested,
least of all the Church herself, that they should be prohibited by the State 21.” Rejected by
the Dáil in March 1974, the bill never became law. The Fine Gael/Labour coalition led by
FitzGerald that was elected in 1981 nonetheless felt boosted by this new attitude of the
Catholic hierarchy towards politics and did not hide its ambition to further ensure the
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liberalisation of  Irish political  and social  life  from Catholic  teachings.  Soon after  the
election,  it  launched  a  vast  “constitutional  crusade”  that  aimed  to  reform  Ireland’s
institutions by making them more secular. As Louise Fuller noted in her article on “New
Ireland and the Undoing of the Catholic Legacy”, developments in Irish society back then
conspired to make FitzGerald’s reform programme difficult, as voters remained divided
between liberal and conservative camps, each wanting to define Irish identity. The new
Taoiseach’s crusade nonetheless set the tone for the whole of the 1980s, and the 1980s
and 1990s  were  consequently  decades  of  intense  reform 22.  If  some of  these  reforms
resulted directly from the Irish government’s will to secularise its laws – in February
1985, for instance, despite strong opposition from the Catholic hierarchy, Minister for
Health Barry Desmond passed the Family Planning (Amendment) Act which made non-
medical contraceptives available to adults without a medical prescription – others were
the direct  result  of  the new sovereignty of  Community Law.  Established in 1963,  the
doctrine  of  Direct  Effect  provided  that  under  certain  conditions  the  provisions  of
European  Law  would  have  direct  effect  and  might  provide  rights  and  remedies  for
individuals that can be enforced against Member States. This is what happened in Ireland,
especially concerning the liberation of  women from the traditional  role in which De
Valera’s moral community had wanted to keep them. In article 119 of the Treaty of Rome,
for example, the EEC advocated equal job opportunities between men and women. Shortly
after  its  admission and the removal  of  the clause  about  the “special  position of  the
Church” in the Constitution, the Irish government consequently voted in a series of laws
that aimed at re-establishing equal job opportunities for women in Ireland – Employment
and Married Women Act (1974), Anti-Discrimination Pay Act (1976), Employment Equality
Act (1977) and, last but not least, the Social Welfare Act (1985) which guaranteed women
the same right to social welfare as men 23. More concretely, EC Law sometimes directly
overruled some of Ireland’s most “traditional” (read Catholic) laws, as was partially the
case in the X case. In 1992, the Irish High Court forbade a pregnant Irish teenager who
had been raped to travel abroad to interrupt her pregnancy. This decision was motivated
by article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution whereby: “The State acknowledges the right to
life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life to the mother, guarantees
in its laws to respect, as far as predictable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right 24
.” In March 1992, the Supreme Court judged otherwise and repealed the teenager’s travel
ban. Following this decision by the Supreme Court a referendum on abortion was held in
November  1992.  In  this  referendum,  65%  of  Irish  voters  judged  that  suicide  was  a
sufficient threat to justify an abortion, 60% were in favour of the right to information on
abortion services and 62% of them believed that the prohibition of abortion should not
limit the right to travel abroad to avail of such services. Judging by the results of the
referendum, which by and large approved of the Supreme Court’s decision, it seems that
by the early 1990s it was not only the Irish government, but Irish civil society as a whole
that had started taking Brussels instead of Rome as its new external referent, if not as its
referee 25.  This  tendency  was  confirmed,  one  year  later,  when  a  directive  from  the
European Court of Human Rights calling for the decriminalisation of homosexual acts
between  two  consenting  adults  made  Ireland  pass  some  legislation  which  legalised
homosexuality 26. According to Louise Fuller, such change shows that, in the area of social
legislation,  “by  the  1980s  and  1990s  not  only  were  bishops  less  able  to  influence
politicians, but politicians themselves did not have the last word as to legislation, nor did
the  national  courts  have  absolute  discretion  as  to  its  interpretation 27”.  European
institutions now have to be reckoned with. This phenomenon, which has affected all of
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the Member States, is not specific to Ireland, but demonstrates the extent to which the
latter has become integrated into the European Union in spite of its national/religious
specificity. 
9 No  doubt,  belonging  to  the  European  Union  has  been  a  permanent  source  of
transformation for Ireland’s own public space and, therefore, for its national identity. As
boasted by the Department  of  Foreign Affairs  in  its  website  on “Ireland in Europe”:
“Membership  has  contributed  to  rapid  progress  in  a  range  of  areas  including  the
development of agriculture, industry and services. It is estimated that 700,000 jobs have
been created in Ireland during the years of membership and that trade has increased 90
fold 28.”  As  a  result,  the  1990s  saw the  creation of  a  so-called  “Celtic  Tiger  Ireland”
characterised by  sustained high levels  of  economic  growth.  Ireland’s  Gross  Domestic
Product increased by 9.8 per cent in 1998 and by 10.7 per cent in 2000, thus turning the
Irish economy into the fastest-growing economy of the whole European Community. If in
1978 Ireland’s GDP was only 58 per cent of the European Community’s average GDP, it had
surpassed  the  United  Kingdom’s  GDP  in  1996  and  represented  119  per  cent  of  the
European  Community’s  average  GDP  in  2000 29.  This  change  in  the  Irish  economy
undeniably opened new horizons in Irish society, which gradually became more confident
and  outward  looking.  With  a  now  transformed  economy,  largely  opened  to  foreign
investments and based on a thriving service industry,  Ireland’s sense of identity was
bound to be altered by permanent contact with otherness, whether that otherness be
European (due to a continued integration into the European Union) or North American
(due to the huge amount of US investments in the Irish economy). To the extent that the
Catholic Church in Ireland, which is now seen as just yet another organisation, no longer
defines Ireland’s national identity. Indeed, “Modern Ireland is the nation of the Celtic
Tiger rather than the land of saints and scholars (which, it could be argued, was a rather
romantic notion anyway). Gone are the days when there were no weddings and dances
during Lent. Vocations to priesthood and religious life are nearly non-existent 30”. On the
one hand, the privileged position of the Church in Ireland can no longer be taken for
granted. On the other hand, the current redefinition of the Church does not mean, I
believe, its complete disappearance from the public arena.
10 In  fact,  according  to  Tony  Fahey:  “Although  Catholics  in  the  Republic  may  be  less
assiduous in religious practice and more critical of the Catholic Church than in the past,
they have been slow to disavow their Catholic connections entirely 31.” In Celtic Tiger
Ireland, just as in most European societies, a redefinition of what it means to be Catholic
seems to have taken place. This redefinition is characterised by a general drop in Church
attendance – between 1999 and 2003, the number of regular attenders and of weekly
attenders fell respectively from 76% and 83% to 70% and 64% 32 – and also by a dramatic
drop in the number of  people going to confession,  as 47% of  Irish Catholics went to
confession on a monthly basis in 1974, as compared to a mere 14% in 1995 33. This does not
mean,  however,  that  the link between Catholicism and today’s  Irish has been totally
severed, but confirms the idea that “when it comes to giving expression to their beliefs,
[the Irish] increasingly prefer a private to a communal setting 34”. And this is shown by
the fact that 60 per cent of Irish people still pray on a regular basis, which is a way for
them to maintain some sort of a connection with the next world. In Ireland’s secular
Tiger society,  Catholic identity and belief have become privatised,  individualised and,
therefore, plural. The sources of definition and of legitimisation of Catholic identity and
belief no longer lie, as used to be the case, in the one moral community, but, on the
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contrary, in the plurality of individuals who can either adopt them or reject them. Thus,
the definition of Catholic identity has become somewhat fragmented in an Ireland where
“the disaffection of the traditional Church has led many to a spiritual quest of their own 35
”. This idea was clearly expressed by columnist Colum Kenney, who wrote: “Hopefully,
there will never be again a uniform ‘Irish Catholic’ but, instead, many Irish Catholics with
personal identities based on open and authentic spiritual practice 36.” It is not only their
identity as Irish people, but also their identity as Catholics that most Irish do not expect
the Roman Catholic institution to continue defining for them. Irish Catholics now want a
more immediate, a more authentic and a more personal link with the next world. In doing
so, they are in fact becoming more like the rest of their European counterparts. Now that
the Irish choose to be Catholic – or not – in contemporary, globalised Ireland, Catholicism
can no longer remain “la culture englobante de la société,  même sous forme sécularisée 37”.
Restructured as a subculture, Catholicism nonetheless remains influential within Irish
society – and, more generally, within the European Union 38 – be it as a lobby 39.
11 In  a  now  redefined  Irish  society,  in  which  Catholicism  has  progressively  become  a
subculture, we can wonder how Ireland now conceives of the place of Catholicism both in
its own and in the European public arena.  As a pro-European,  Ireland’s ex-Taoiseach
Bertie Ahern willingly recognised that taking Brussels instead of Rome as a new external
referent through EU membership had played a vital role in his country’s recent success
story 40. Yet Bertie Ahern also believed that the one did not necessarily exclude the other.
Indeed, after a visit to Pope Benedict XVI in 2005, Ahern wrote in Ireland’s The Irish Times
that his meeting with the Pope was “a reminder of the values at the heart of the European
project”: “Our future can only be shaped with confidence when we are secularly rooted in
our culture and in our community. One pillar of that culture is the Christian tradition. It
is a culture of community, but one with deep respect for the individual. […] It is the
foundation of our common European inheritance 41.” Still according to Ahern, now that
Ireland has become more confident thanks to EU membership, it should become more
actively involved in the European project, whether politically, economically or culturally.
Back in 1989, Irish professor of moral theology Enda McDonagh already believed that:
In its closer integration with Europe, Ireland and its people with their political and
intellectual leaders will have a responsibility to further the dialogue between the
political and transcendent dimensions of freedom. […]. It must also of course seek
to cherish the rich, if diverse, Irish identity within an interdependent Europe in the
face of any attempt at shallow homogenisation 42.
12 Twenty years on, it seems that Enda McDonagh’s wish has been heard by Irish politicians,
who pushed for the amendment of Article 51 of the proposed European constitutional
treaty (2004) so as to clarify the status of  Churches in their relations with European
institutions. This was done, according to Bertie Ahern, because “structured dialogue with
the churches offers the opportunity to listen anew in an open and transparent way to an
inner  voice  in  the  Irish  and  European  tradition.”43 For  the  same  reason,  Ireland
encouraged the mention of Europe’s common past Christian heritage in the European
constitution’s  preamble,  while  more fiercely secular  countries  such as  France largely
objected to  it.  Is  Ireland therefore  a  country with a  mission in  the European public
sphere? According to current editorialist of Studies, Fergus O’Donoghue, 
Ireland […] has become so much a part of the European project that we are now at
its heart. Our recent membership of the UN Security Council shows that we are able
to punch well  above our weight.  Our attempt to have God mentioned in the EU
Constitution was itself a sign that we defend traditions and values, even when some
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commentators see them as “outmoded”. We can reaffirm the values that are the
basis of the European ideal and can affirm the need for ever-closer cooperation 44.
13 Whether or not Ireland is a country with a – Catholic – mission in Europe’s public arena is
largely arguable. It is undeniable, however, that Ireland’s more active role, of late, in the
shaping of EU institutions and of their relations to Europe’s Churches challenges France’s
definition of a secular Europe ! If, as shown recently by the Millward Brown IMS opinion
poll carried out on the no vote in the Lisbon referendum (12 June 2008), the main reason
for  Irish  people  to  have  voted  no  to  the  Treaty  was  “lack  of  understanding  or
understanding” of what they were asked to vote on (42%), the other two main reasons
were the fear that “the introduction of a conscription into a European army was included
in the treaty” (33%) and the fear that “it would end Ireland’s control over the country’s
abortion policy 45”. If these reasons were the ones given by the people having voted no,
they were probably widely shared in Ireland, as 67% of respondents of a Eurobarometer
poll considered that the “no” campaign was the more convincing one 46. No matter what
one thinks about those fears, they corroborate the idea that a considerable part of the
Irish are still endeared to the principle of neutrality and to Catholic teachings in social
matters, and that they want to defend them in (spite of) Brussels. This does not mean,
however, that the Irish are now shying away from Brussels. In spite of the victory of the
no  vote,  “60  per  cent  of  voters  felt  that  Ireland’s  interests  were  best  pursued  by
remaining fully involved in the EU 47”. A view shared by the island’s new Taoiseach, Brian
Cowen, who recently emphasised “[…] the imperative for Ireland to be fully engaged with
our partners in the European Union” in Fianna Fáil  parliamentary party in Galway 48.
Faring in a sea of serious global economic trouble, Ireland is aware of the importance to
embrace  the  European  project,  be  it  to  better  control  it.  It  does  not  seem  willing,
however, to sacrifice its Catholic heritage – still too often misleadingly confused for its
national  identity –  to do so.  This  is  why it  is  now more than time that  one started
studying in greater detail the influence both of Ireland as a Member State and of Irish
Catholicism as a lobby in Brussels, on Europe’s emerging public sphere – defined as “[…]
l’arène  d’expression  des  engagements  collectifs  et  des  allégeances,  le  lieu  où  se  nouent  les
interactions  de  ces  variables  avec  les  pratiques  et  les  discours  de  pouvoir 49”  –  and  more
specifically on Europe’s perception of the role of religions in this public sphere.  Will
David, once more, triumph over Goliath?
NOTES
1. Patsy McGarry, “The Rise and Fall of Roman Catholicism in Ireland” in Louise Fuller,
John Littleton and Eamon Maher (eds.),  Irish and Catholic.  Towards  an Understanding of
Identity, Dublin, The Columba Press, 2006, pp. 31-44, p. 32.
2. Timothy J. White, “Decoupling Catholic and National Identity: Secularisation Theories
in the Irish Context.” Ibid., pp. 238-255, p. 244.
Closer to Brussels than to Rome? The EU as the new external referent for a se...
Études irlandaises, 34.1 | 2009
9
3. Toney Fahey, B.C Hayes and R. Sinnott (eds.), Conflict and Consensus: A Study of Values and
Attitudes  in  the  Republic  of  Ireland  and  Northern  Ireland,  Dublin,  Institute  of  Public
Administration, 2005, p. 31. 
4. The adjective liberal is used to describe social, economic and political views throughout
this article.  All  three are derived from the elaboration,  during the Enlightenment,  of
liberalism  as  an  ideology  advocating  that  politics  should  first  and  foremost  protect
individual  rights  and maximise  individual  freedom of  choice.  When used to describe
social attitudes, it refers to a certain openness to the introduction of new ideas and to
proposals of social reforms. When used in relation to politics, it refers to the belief that
individuals should pursue their lives according to their own perception of the good and
that the State should generally not dictate morality. Similarly, when used to describe
economic  perspectives,  the  word liberal  refers  to  the  idea  that  the  state  should not
intervene  too  much  in  the  economic  realm  and  that  an  open  economy  should  be
preferred,  therefore,  to protectionism. Lastly,  it  is  also used to describe the Church’s
classic perception of education in Ireland until the 1960s. In that context, the adjective
liberal is to be understood in its original meaning as “Directed to general intellectual
enlargement and refinement; not narrowly restricted to the requirements of technical or
professional training” in The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VIII (2nd edition), Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 881.
5. Ken Whitaker (1916- ) became Secretary of the Department of Finance in 1956. It was in
this position that he became the author of the First Programme for Economic Expansion,
a White Paper that was released in 1958 and that advocated the reform and liberalisation
of Ireland’s economy.
6. Michael Fogarty, Liam Ryan and Joseph Lee (eds.), Irish Values and Attitudes. The Irish
Report of the European Value System, Dublin, Dominican Publications, 1984, p. 101.
7. Marie-Claire  Considère-Charon,  Irlande :  une  singulière  intégration  européenne,  Paris,
Economica, 2002, p. 27.
8. John  Bradley,  “Managing  Globalisation:  Ireland’s  Experience  in  Attracting  Foreign
Investment”  in  Catherine  Maignant,  (dir.),  Le  tigre  celtique  en  question.  L’Irlande
contemporaine: économie, Etat, société, Caen, PU Caen, 2007, pp. 12-25, p. 19. 
9. Fogarty, op. cit., p. 101.
10. Louise  Fuller,  Irish  Catholicism  Since  1950:  The  Undoing  of  a  Culture,  Dublin,
Gill&Macmillan, 2002, p. 149. 
11. Ibid., p. 151.
12. Alfredo  Canavero  and  Jean-Dominique  Durand,  “Les  phénomènes  religieux  et
l’identification européenne” in Frank Robert (dir.), Les Identités européennes au XXe siècle.
Diversités, convergences et solidarités, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004, pp. 145-164,
p. 152. 
13. Timothy  J.  White,  “Nationalism  VS.  Liberalism  in  the  Irish  Context:  From  a
Postcolonial Past to a Postmodern Future” in Eire-Ireland, An Interdisciplinary Journal of Irish
Studies, Vol. 38, n° 3-4, 2002, pp. 25-37, p. 31. 
14. Considère-Charon, op. cit., p. 9.
15. Bradley, op. cit., p. 24.
16. Ireland’s support for the EU project continues despite the recent No vote in the Lisbon
referendum.  Released in The Irish  Times in  September 2008,  the Millward Brown IMS
Closer to Brussels than to Rome? The EU as the new external referent for a se...
Études irlandaises, 34.1 | 2009
10
opinion poll on the Lisbon No vote carried out for the government clearly showed that,
despite the outcome, “60 per cent of voters felt that Ireland’s interests were best pursued
by remaining fully involved in the EU.” The Irish Times, 10 September 2008.
17. Considère-Charon, op. cit., p. 51.
18. Peter D. Sutherland, “Ireland: Where do we stand on European Integration?” in Studies
, vol. 78, n° 311, 1989, pp. 243-254, p. 248.
19. Editorial, Studies, vol. 74, n° 293, 1985, p. 10.
20. Quoted from Jerome Connolly, “The Irish Churches and Foreign Policy” in Studies, vol.
77, n° 395, 1988, pp. 55-67, p. 59.
21. The Irish Independent, 26 November 1973.
22. Louise Fuller, “New Ireland and the Undoing of the Catholic Legacy: Looking Back to
the Future”, in Louise Fuller, John Littleton and Eamon Maher (eds.), Irish and Catholic.
Towards an Understanding of Identity. Dublin, The Columba Press, 2006, pp. 68-87, p. 82.
23. Considère-Charon, op. cit., p. 172.
24. Bunreacht na hEireann, article 40.3.3.
25. As pointed out by Maire Nic Ghiolla Phadraig: “The advance consultation with the
hierarchy on policies of legislation impinging on sex, family life, or education gave way to
informing them in advance, and then to the 1992 statement by An Taoiseach that he had
no intention of talking to the bishops about the wording of an abortion referendum, and
the 1993 permission for condom-vending machines again without notice to the bishops.
The  state,  of  course,  has  had  a  new  external  referent  since  joining  the  European
Community and looks to Brussels rather than Rome for approval of policies as well as for
financial support.” in “The Power of the Catholic Church in the Republic of Ireland”, in
Patrick  Clancy  et  al.,  Irish Society,  Sociological  Perspectives,  Dublin,  Institute  of  Public
Administration, 1995, pp. 593-619, p. 612.
26. As shown by Louise Fuller, this is to be contrasted with what had happened 10 years
earlier, when “[…] the Supreme Court had rejected an appeal by David Norris to declare
that two Acts inherited from the period of British rule were unconstitutional and cited
the preamble to the 1937 Constitution, which points to the people of Ireland as ‘humbly
acknowledging their obligation to Our Divine Lord Jesus Christ’ as the reason for their
rejection of the plea [to decriminalise homosexuality]”, Fuller 2002, op. cit., p. 85.
27. Fuller 2006, op. cit., p. 85.
28. http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx ?id=28457&media=print [Accessed 14 March 2008].
29. Considère-Charon, op. cit., p. 55.
30. John  Littleton,  “Catholic  Identity  and  the  Irish  Context”  in Louise  Fuller,  John
Littleton and Eamon Maher (eds.), Irish and Catholic. Towards an Understanding of Identity,
Dublin, The Columba Press, 2006, pp. 12-30, p. 29.
31. Fahey, B. C. Hayes and R. Sinnott (eds.), Conflict and Consensus: A Study of Values and
Attitudes  in  the  Republic  of  Ireland  and  Northern  Ireland,  Dublin,  Institute  of  Public
Administration, 2005, p. 55.
32. Ibid., p. 43.
33. Marguerite  Corish,  “Pratiques  et  croyances  religieuses,  valeurs  morales”  in  Paul
Brennan (dir.), La sécularisation en Irlande, Caen, Presses universitaires de Caen, 1998, p.
140.
Closer to Brussels than to Rome? The EU as the new external referent for a se...
Études irlandaises, 34.1 | 2009
11
34. Eoin Cassidy (ed.), Measuring Ireland. Discerning Values and Beliefs, Dublin, Veritas, 2002,
p. 29.
35. Catherine Maignant, “Re-Imagining Transcendence in the Global Village” in Eamon
Maher and Michael Böss, Engaging Modernity, Dublin, Veritas, 2003, pp. 71-84, p. 74.
36. Colum Kenney, “‘God Help Us!’: The Media and Irish Catholicism” in Louise Fuller,
John Littleton and Eamon Maher (eds.),  Irish and Catholic.  Towards  an Understanding of
Identity, Dublin, The Columba Press, 2006, pp. 89-103, p. 102.
37. Jean-Paul Willaime, “L’évolution de la place du religieux dans la société” in Cahiers
Français, n° 340, septembre-octobre 2007, pp. 3-7, p. 8.
38. See to that effect Bérengère Massignon’s study of the impact of religions – including
Catholicism – on the European Union in Brussels entitled Des dieux et des fonctionnaires.
Religions et laïcités face au défi de la construction européenne, Rennes, Presses Universitaires
de Rennes, 2007.
39. Concerning the self-definition by the Catholic lobby of its role in the European public
arena, see François Foret and Philip Schlesinger, “Le religieux dans la légitimation de
l’Union européenne” in François Foret (ed.), L’espace public européen à l’épreuve du religieux,
Bruxelles, Editions Libres de Bruxelles, 2007, pp. 229-249, pp. 244-245.
40. “As a country Ireland is now more successful, more confident and optimistic than at
any time since the foundation of the State. We are a country transformed. And our EU
membership has played a vital role in this transformation. We must not forget this. We
must not take it for granted.” Bertie Ahern, “Where does the European Union go now?” in
Studies, vol. 94, n°375, Autumn 2005, pp. 227-236, p. 231.
41. Bertie Ahern, “Meeting with Pope a reminder of values at heart of European project”
in The Irish Times, 7 July 2005.
42. Enda McDonagh, “Europe, the Faith and Ireland” in Studies, vol. 78, n° 311, Autumn
1989, pp. 255-261, p. 260.
43. The Irish Times, 7 July 2005.
44. Studies, vol. 93, n° 369, Spring 2004, p. 6.
45. The Irish Times, 10 September 2008. In fact, those figures confirm those of the Flash
Eurobarometer  report  released  in  July  2008:  http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/
fl_245_full_en.pdf [Accessed 9 September 2008].
46. Ibid.
47. The Irish Times, 10 September 2008.
48. Ibid.
49. François Foret, “Introduction”, L’espace public européen à l’épreuve du religieux, op. cit.,
p. 11. 
Closer to Brussels than to Rome? The EU as the new external referent for a se...
Études irlandaises, 34.1 | 2009
12
ABSTRACTS
As soon as Ireland submitted its first application for EEC membership in 1961, Brussels became
another external referent alongside Rome for an Irish society that increasingly looked to outside
influences. If the Irish Catholic Church first was reluctant for Ireland to join in the European
project, it soon realised the importance of embracing the project, if only to control it. Brussels
has  nonetheless  seriously  challenged  Rome’s  position  as  Ireland’s  main  external  point  of
reference in the last four decades, to the extent that the Irish Catholic Church is now perceived
as yet another institution. It remains, however, quite influential in Irish politics and so a force to
be reckoned with when it comes to analysing the island’s perception of the European project. The
present article consists above all of a general review of the way EEC membership has transformed
the relationship between Church and State in Ireland for almost fifty years now.
Dès  que  l’Irlande  soumit  sa  première  demande  d’adhésion  à  la  CEE,  Rome  cessa  d’être  la
principale source de référence étrangère pour faire place à Bruxelles dans cette société s’ouvrant
progressivement sur l’extérieur. Si l’Église catholique d’Irlande vit tout d’abord d’un mauvais œil
cette volonté de l’île de se joindre au projet européen, elle se rendit tout de même vite compte de
l’importance d’embrasser l’initiative, ne serait-ce que pour mieux la contrôler. Bruxelles n’en est
pas moins devenue un sérieux adversaire de l’hégémonie romaine en Irlande depuis bientôt un
demi-siècle,  à tel point que l’Église catholique y est désormais perçue comme une institution
parmi d’autres. Cependant, son influence en politique persiste et elle demeure une force non
négligeable pour toute analyse de la perception de l’Europe par l’Irlande. Le présent article se
veut  avant tout  une revue générale  de la  manière dont l’adhésion à la  CEE a  fait  évoluer la
relation entre Eglise et Etat en Irlande depuis un peu moins de cinquante ans maintenant.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Église catholique d’Irlande, Union Européenne / CEE, sécularisation, identité
nationale
Keywords: Irish Catholic Church, national identity, secularization, European Union / EEC
AUTHOR
JEAN-CHRISTOPHE PENET
NCFIS Dublin
Closer to Brussels than to Rome? The EU as the new external referent for a se...
Études irlandaises, 34.1 | 2009
13
